In the late 1990 's, financial 
INTRODUCTION
arge scale accounting scandals involving Enron, Global Crossing, Arthur Anderson etc., hit the United States (US) in late 2001 and early 2002, causing lot of confusion and distrust in the US financial markets. Members of both parties, facing the mid-term elections and a very angry electorate, called for stringent legislation. The U S Congress hastily put together a Draconian law sponsored by Senator Sarbanes (D-MD) and House Representative Oxley (R-OH) and passed the bill on short order. On July 30, 2002, President Bush as hastily signed the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 into law, describing it as, "the most far-reaching reforms of American business since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt," (Whalen, 2003) .
PROVISIONS OF SARBANES -OXLEY ACT
Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbox or SOX), also known as Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act 0f 2002, was intended to provide a proper accounting framework and rules for public companies. The Act's stated objective is, "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate financial statements and disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws," (Berger, 2005) . SOX seeks to prevent and punish corporate corruption.  Violators of SEC rules will be barred from serving as directors of any issuer.  Attorneys appearing before the SEC are to report any violations of securities laws by a public company to the chief legal counsel or the CEO of the company, or directly to the SEC.
Title IV: Enhanced Financial Disclosures


Reports filed with the SEC must include all material off-balance sheet transactions and relationships that may have material effect on the financial status of an issuer.  Prohibits loans to be extended to senior executives.  Title IV also includes the Notorious Section 404 which requires annual statement of issuer to contain an INTERNAL CONTROL REPORT which shall o state that the management is responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. o contain an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal controls.
Each issuer's auditor shall attest to and report on the assessment made by the management. 
THE HIGH COST OF SOX-SECTION 404: COMPLAINTS AGAINST SOX
The act contains many corporate governance reforms. The vast majority of the Act's provisions are positive, but the many benefits are being eclipsed by section 404. A survey by NASDAQ (2005) indicated that:
Sarbox is not the issue, Section 404, implementation costs are the issue. 2.
Audit fees have increased permanently. Average cost of Sarbox implementation of a mid size company is over $1 million. The cost definitely does not justify the benefit. 3.
Even small cap companies are forced to pay up to $200,000 for section 404 implementation. A $ 200 million company cannot have the same standards as a $ 20 billion company. One size does not fit all.
4.
Audit firms are compelled to be over-conservative and generate higher fees as a result.
5.
Auditors keep charging more fees. Audit committee cannot say no. Management cannot say no. Whoever says no will risk being sued if anything goes wrong. 6.
Many executives consider SOX as onerous and only fattening the bottom lines of accounting firms while costing business firms billions of dollars.
Steve Forbes (2005) recently delivered a scathing criticism of Sox as follows:
1. Sarbox is a destructive piece of legislation, rushed through congress in the aftermath of the World Com debacle. This ill-thought, hastily written law has cost shareholders and the US economy infinitely more money than Bernie Ebbers and his ilk ever did.
2.
SOX imposes hefty costs on publicly held companies. It has become a boon to the accounting industry since in many cases fees have doubled or even tripled.
3.
It is not only the billions of dollars of mostly wasted money but the long periods of time top management is spending in trying to comply with Section 404 instead of focusing on running their businesses.
4.
The law has inhibited risk taking. Directors and executives must now ask themselves how a particular corporate decision looks in a court of law. The onerous requirements of SOX fall disproportionately on small and mid-cap companies which are the most innovative and entrepreneurial drivers of change in our economy. According to Wallison (2006) , "the most far-reaching effect of Sarbox may be indirect and intangible. By placing a congressional Imprimatur on the notion that managements have to be supervised and controlled by independent boards, the act may have set up an adversarial relationship between managements and boards that will, over time, impair corporate risk-taking and thus economic growth." 5.
Sarbox removed a salient pillar of corporate form of business, limited liability. It has brought back the equivalent of the centuries old debtor's prison. Unlimited liability means less risk taking and less economic growth. 6.
Finally, Sox miserably flunks the cost-benefit analysis too.
GOOD BYE NEW YORK! HELLO, LONDON!
Schuman (2006) observes that since the time the law was enacted, a growing chorus of critics claimed that Sarbanes-Oxley Act went too far, saddling companies with costly and unnecessary auditing requirements that put U. S. registered companies and the U. S. markets at a global disadvantage. Sox has reduced the competitive power of U S business firms in the global markets by subjecting them to enormous Sox compliance costs. Furthermore, because of the onerous requirements of Sox, foreign companies are foregoing the U S stock exchanges for friendlier environments abroad. In fact, a recent study by Foley and Lardner found that 20% of public companies are considering going private just to avoid Sarbox compliance. As Factor (2006) states, "it is no wonder, then, that the London Stock Exchange (LSE) -eager to exploit a competitive advantage -now promotes itself by reminding companies that by listing on the LSE they are not subject to Sarbox." Murray (2006) notes that nine out of ten largest Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in 2006, and 24 out of 25 largest in 2005 were done in overseas markets. That is a remarkable change from the 1990s, when the vast majority of IPOs were made in the U. S. financial markets (Murray, 2006) . Perrin (2006) reports that in a survey of 80 international companies that conducted an IPO on its markets in 2005, the companies first considered listing on U S exchanges but 90 per cent of those companies felt that demands of SOX made listing in London more attractive. Hamlin (2006) recently stated that a senior Hong Kong-based investment banker observed that if his company listed its shares on a U S exchange, then under U S law, he would be personally responsible for what goes on in his company.. He added, "Would you sign off on that? You would be a lunatic to do it!" (Hamlin, 2006 ). Brown (2006) found that when Peach Holdings, a Florida based lending outfit wanted to mount an IPO, it shunned U S stock markets and raised $231 million on the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Here is the peachy math. It would have had to pay a $100,000 fee to list on NASDAQ in addition to over $2 million to comply with the onerous burden of the requirements of SOX. To list on AIM, the company spent only $500,000 including a fee of $7,600 to the London Stock Exchange. According to Byrne (2007) , the figures say it all. In the past four years, the total IPOs raised on the NYSE has increased by 167 per cent. During the same period, there was a staggering 998 per cent increase in funds raised on the main listings of LSE. Zhu and Small (2007) observed that the passage of SOX had a "detrimental impact and a chilling effect" on international companies' decisions whether to cross-list in the U S. Perrin (2006) also reports that a University of Rochester study concluded that the overall effect of SOX has reduced the stock value of American companies by a staggering $1.4 trillion, so far.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED REMEDIES
Obviously something is wrong. As Wallison (2006) observes, Sox and its ancillary SEC regulations contributed to a recent Security Industry Estimate that the industry spends $25 billion annually on SEC compliance. These costs are naturally passed on to persons and companies that use the U. S. securities markets. A recent study by the London Stock Exchange showed that underwriting costs in London were roughly half of those in the U. S.! DeMint and Feeny (2006) recently introduced legislation that would require the SEC to create alternative provisions for companies that wish to opt out of Section 404 of SOX. The new U. S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson is supporting a committee that was set up to review the SOX law and other aspects of the regulation of capital markets in the U. S. As Perrin (2006) observes, discontent in the U S regarding the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulatory procedures in the post-SOX era seem to be growing more and more "punitive and adversarial in nature."
A U. S. Chamber of Commerce study wanted the SEC to appoint a committee to examine its enforcement practices. Two U S Lobby groups, the Free Enterprise Fund and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, recently launched a constitutional legal challenge to the creation of the PCAOB by SOX. Powell (2005) suggests a suitable
